Introduction
The object of this paper is to analyze rural household livelihood and educational investment decisions for future generations in a post-conflict setting located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh (see annex 4 for a map). This is a region in the South-Eastern part of the country where a low level insurgency took place between 1976 and 1997, which officially terminated after a peace accord in December, 1997 . The armed struggle was between the state's security forces, mainly the Bangladesh army, and the ethnically distinct local population, in an otherwise fairly homogenous nation in terms of language and religion. The insurgency aimed at regional autonomy rather than independence, but the principal local grievance was against officially sponsored land encroachment by outsiders (mainstream Bangladeshis or Bengalis), who posed a threat not only to local livelihoods, but potentially also to a distinct local way of life; see Chakma (2006) and Roy (2000) , for example. All of this took place in the landhungry context of the most densely populated larger country in the world, which is also a low-income developing nation where agriculture continues to be the main source of the population's livelihood. Thus, neo-Malthusian factors may be at work in Bangladesh.
Population growth adds to land scarcity, which can be further exacerbated by environmental degradation, and can fuel conflict over greed for ever scarcer land and environmental resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999) .
There is now a substantial literature on the causes of large scale internal conflict in the rational choice tradition. These explanations have tended to centre on either the grievance hypothesis (mainly linked to inequalities between distinct groups delineated by ethnicity, religion or some other marker), or the greed motivation (reflecting the desire to control capturable rents); see Murshed (2010, chapter 3) for a review. In reality these competing explanations may be actually complementary, as greed and grievance motivations often follow one another and can be simultaneously present as an armed dispute develops (Murshed, 2010) . A great deal of empirical work has also been conducted to test the empirical validity of these allegedly competing theories. The results are inconclusive, mainly due to data paucity on group based inequality (also known as horizontal inequality). But the important point is that many of the quantitative studies on civil war are cross-country in nature, where the experiences of civil war in different and far-flung countries are lumped together in one single statistical (econometric) exercise. One can, therefore, be sceptical about the results of such regression analyses, as the various populations under scrutiny are not necessarily drawn from a homogenous population.
Quite apart from this conceptual objection to cross-country quantitative analyses, there is also a need to conduct more systematic quantitative studies of the drivers and consequences of conflict at a more local (micro) level within nation states, a research area that is still relatively neglected; see Verwimp, Justino and Brück (2009) for a plea for more such studies. Armed conflict may have far reaching consequences for rural livelihood strategies, including investment decisions and cropping patterns. This may contribute to analysis of poverty, as well as development in general, particularly rural development. Lacunae associated with localised conflict become even more acute when it comes to the economic analyses of the short and long term impacts of conflict on households' decision-making. The first innovation of the paper is that it is able to make a contribution in this connection, based on an unique data-set compiled during a socioeconomic survey of households resident in this area in 2007 (Barkat et. al, 2009 ).
The rural farming household is no stranger to risky outlays, as returns to cropping or animal husbandry are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. The nature of these risks and uncertainties can be altered by armed conflict of a sufficiently long duration, and also depend on the intensity of the conflict. This affects the livelihood and investment decisions of households. Prolonged war can also change patterns of property rights, usufructuary rights under common ownership, as well as social capital governing interhousehold interaction. The livelihood framework acknowledges an inherent inseparability between production and consumption decisions for rural households (Bardhan and Udry, 1999 , chapter 2) which effects labour allocation between farm and off-farm (including education) activities, as well as cropping (and animal husbandry activities) for own consumption and the market.
Our analysis is conducted in the post-accord era, a decade after a peace treaty which allegedly ended the war. As is well known, treaties and accords across the developing world rarely coincide with the total cessation of violence, and the fear that conflict will reignite pervades many post-conflict societies. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) , in their cross-country study, point out that civil war is likely to resume within a decade in a typical low-income nation. Another important policy issue in post-conflict environments is the resumption of economic activity and growth. As far as economic recovery after the formal cessation of hostilities is concerned, post-conflict growth can be lopsided, favouring infrastructure reconstruction over agriculture or manufacturing due to war time collateral damage to public assets as well as the perceived riskiness of investment in these sectors which take a long time to yield dividends (Addison and Murshed, 2005) . On the other hand, other authors emphasize a more general 'Phoenix' factor (Organski and Kugler, 1977; Koubi, 2005) . In other words, rapid economic growth (in the aggregate macroeconomic sense) follows intense and prolonged hostilities. There can, however, be differences across various economic sectors. Crucially, perceptions about the security environment may affect investment and livelihood choices. The second innovation of the paper lies in the fact that the survey employed in the paper contains information about perceptions of violent experiences, which in turn impact on household economic decision making. The use of this data, which has subjective (psychological) and objective elements, is in line with contemporary behavioural economics. As will be seen below our results suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom, which points to increased subsistence cultivation following war, heightened perceptions of violence can encourage risk taking, greater crop diversification into cash crops and greater investment in the education of future generations. This has similarities to the findings of Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) in the context of rural Burundi, where conflict can result in the increased production of cash and export crops for the market rather than mere subsistence cultivation.
The research question, at least as far as developing countries are concerned, is whether there is a strong negative association between conflict risk and economic prosperity. Bates (2001) has indicated that this relationship can, however, be non-linear over time.
Increased prosperity at first can induce greater violence, especially because of the dislocating effects of rapid growth (Olson, 1963) , and because peace accords may atrophy and decay.
3 But, prolonged growth can only be maintained if conflict declines.
Our results make a contribution to this literature on the non-linear relationship between violence and prosperity, because it seems that higher perceptions of violence may encourage more market based activity plus longer term investment in human capital.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief sketch of the context of the conflict in Bangladesh and its Chittagong Hill Tracts region, section 3 contains a description of the data and methodology, section 4 presents our statistical (econometric) results, and section 5 is by way of conclusion.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Region of Bangladesh
Bangladesh is in the Ganges delta formed by the confluence of three rivers; Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna which creates one of the most fertile plains in the world. It is one of the highest densely (1,229/sq.km) populated countries of the world where the amount of per capita arable land is only 0.1 hectare in 2007. It is a low income developing country with about 50% of the population (using the international poverty line of below $1.25 per day) living in poverty (World Bank; . Over last two decades, Bangladesh's economy experienced growth rates of around 5.5% per annum, but still a large part of GDP emanatse from traditional agriculture (World Development Indicators).
This makes land the scarcest and competed over resource in Bangladesh. Land grabbing is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, and various types of economic and political exploitation, as well as outright crime, are associated with land holding (Barkat and Roy, 2008 (Roy, 2000 , Barkat et al. 2009 and Mohsin, 2003 . Land is the key factor of production in the CHT economy, to which the indigenous people are deeply rooted. Traditionally, almost all the communities were engaged in subsistence jum or swidden cultivation. Besides jum cultivation, there exists small scale plough cultivation as well. The indigenous peoples were self-sufficient in terms of food in earlier times. Despite its apparent relative land abundance in the context of Bangladesh, the CHT region is actually land-scarce in terms of availability of land for cultivation (only 23% of the land is arable). There is a sharp decline in per capita arable land during last few decades. On the basis of available data on land and population it is estimated that in 1974 the amount of per capita arable land was about 0.45 hectare which declined to about 0.24 hectare in 1991. Most of the land is either non-inhabitable due to its topography, or is restricted by law (reserve or protected forest areas). The land ownership patterns as well as types of land in CHT also differ from that of plain regions.
Customary (common) ownership of land exists here, and at the same time private property rights are also recognised by the State which makes the ownership issue more complex (Roy 2000 , Adnan 2004 and Barkat et.al. 2009 ).
About one-fourth of the total CHT land is occupied by reserve forests, which restricts Consequently the indigenous leadership (Raja, Headman, Karbari) lost control over the land (Roy, 2000 and Mohsin, 2003) . (Barkat et al. 2009 ). This research captures the effects of such violence through factoring in the subjective perceptions of potential violence as a factor in livelihood decision-making.
Data and Methodology
Our information encompasses both quantitative and qualitative data, where the latter complements and substantiates, the results derived from the former type of data. 
Livelihood Decision-making Variables
Three household decisions: consumption expenditure, investment decisions with regard to children's schooling and production (cropping) decisions are analyzed. The descriptive statistics pertaining to these variables are given annex table 2.
Data on Consumption Expenditure were analysed using a separate format for food and non-food expenditure from households. The calculation procedure for both food and nonfood consumption expenditure used the imputation methodology to monetize the expenditure where the consumption item was not bought or domestically produced. The average per capita annual cash-equivalent consumption expenditure was Tk. 11,847.
We consider the decision to Enrol children in school as an investment (human capital accumulating) decision. Data on total number of children enrolled in both primary and secondary school were analysed at the household level, within the age brackets 6-18.
We take Type of Crop Produced as the proxy for production-investment decisions. Data on types of crop produced show that a total number of 35 different types of crops are produced by indigenous households in CHT. At the first stage crops are grouped into food and cash crops. Households are then categorised into one or other or 'mixed'.
Empirical Model
Our quantitative analysis primarily focuses on the relation or association between the perceived threat of violence and livelihood decision-making by indigenous ethnic minority households. Thus our sample from the survey data set is confined to indigenous households in CHT. At the first stage, statistical tools such as bivariate analysis and nonparametric tests were used. Annex table 3 shows the summary of specifications for household livelihood decision-making represented by consumption, investment and production decision. For consumption decisions an OLS model was used. But for investment in children's education and production (cropping) decisions a Logit or Probit models were specified. The latter two cases measure the probability or chance of an event occurring. The standard regression equation is as follows: 
Results
This section analyses the determinants of household consumption decisions, followed by two other important livelihood decisions, investment in children's education and cropping (production) decisions, in relation to varying degrees of subjective perceptions of the threat of violence. We believe this to be a major innovation of our study, because we attempt to gauge the impact of subjective perceptions upon economic decision making with regard to consumption, output (cropping) and investment decisions after an uneasy
peace accord that only imperfectly ended the conflict. Within the context we are studying, land dispossession is a key factor, and the continuing fear of intimidation with a view to further land alienation is likely to impact on indigenous households' decision making under uncertainty. To this end, and to sharpen our focus and analysis, we classify individual indigenous household's fears (of violence) into different intensities: high, medium and low.
The conventional wisdom is that subsistence consumption recovers rapidly following the cessation of hostilities, as suggested by Organski and Kugler (1977) and Koubi (2005) who point to a 'Phoenix' factor in terms of rapid growth recovery following conflict. This is, however, a strictly macroeconomic phenomenon. Moving on to output, production in some sectors may, however, be adversely affected, due to damage to infrastructure (Murshed, 2010, chapter 6 ). Agricultural production is said to be particularly susceptible to these effects, compared to activities in the service sector and construction. This is unlikely to apply to our case, as the conflict in CHT was a low-intensity insurgency, and did not do much damage to the already low amount of infrastructure in this highly afforested region.
With regard to household consumption decisions, we examine the influence of violence on consumption expenditure as a whole and for food and non-food consumption expenditure separately. Our results (OLS estimation) suggest that there is significant negative relationship between perceived violence and consumption expenditure decisions (Table 1) . 10 We found that the households perceiving medium level of violence spend 4% less (per capita consumption) expenditure as compared to the households who perceive a low level of violence. Households perceiving high violence spend 10% less on consumption expenditure as compared to those households perceiving low violence. This adverse influence is found to be more in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance when only non-food expenditure is considered. Households perceiving medium and high violence spend 11.5% and 15.6% less on non-food consumption compared to those households perceiving low violence. The influence of perceived violence is found significantly higher for non-food consumption expenditure compared to food consumption for the households perceiving medium and high violence. As expected, household size also influences the amount of per capita consumption expenditure negatively. We interpret the relation between different levels of perceived violence and amount of consumption expenditure considering the household as an active decision maker rather than as passive victims of violence.
From the investment and production points of view the picture is somewhat different.
Households perceiving higher levels of violence seem more interested in saving and investing in the production of cash crops, and in developing human capital compared to households who perceive less violence. This may also inhibit their consumption expenditures. This tendency may be even more applicable to relatively affluent households. The higher influence of perceived violence on non-food consumption expenditure decision can be explained by the fact that when households face any type of increasing risk they will first reduce their non-food expenditure to provide savings for future security, followed by food expenditure as food is a basic necessity.
Investment in human capital in CHT is especially important as this may enable people to increase their productivity in agriculture and trading, and to participate in the process of income generation and remunerative employment in new occupations, as well as potentially migrate (UNDP, 1995) . In terms of time horizons investment can be shorter term or longer term, with education being one of the longer term investments. Decisions to enrol children in school can be a proxy of investment decisions for the future, and because children are potentially suppliers of household labour it is not free of opportunity cost. Households also need to pay some or all of the educational expenses incurred (Bedi and Marshall, 2002) .
Our Probit regression results in table 2 indicate that variation in the likelihood of children's enrolment is not significantly explained by differences in perceived violence as the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The variables on pre-peace accord experience of violence (displacement, land dispossession and experience; participation in or victim of armed conflict) are also found to be insignificant. But introducing interaction terms for variables on pre-peace accord experience of violence and post-conflict perceived violence engenders statistical significance. The statistical significance of the interaction term points to the existence of a more complex mechanism effecting fears of violence on local child enrolment. In other words, current perceptions of violence do impact on whether households choose to school their children locally, but it is related to other factors such as earlier experiences of violence, emigration and land dispossession.
The interaction between displacement (which means the household left during the conflict and subsequently returned) and current perceived high violence is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the households who were displaced before the peace accord, and currently perceive high violence, are more likely to send children to school (32.5%) compared to households who also migrated but perceive low violence levels. Similarly, households that experienced armed conflict before the peace accord, and currently perceive high violence are more likely to school children (26%) compared to households who experienced armed conflict and currently perceive low violence. This mutual reinforcing element in the combined violence variable is not applicable to households who experienced land dispossession before the peace accord. Our estimates suggest that households who experienced land dispossession before the peace accord, along with a high violence perception are less likely to school their children (29%), compared to those who also experienced land dispossession before the peace accord, but perceive low violence. The experience of land dispossession is traumatic, and creates huge economic vulnerabilities, as land is the most productive asset. This may lower the likelihood of their sending their children to school, possibly due to rejection of Bengali culture.
One anomalous finding relates to the fact that households with more educated heads (above secondary education) are less likely to school their children locally (by 36%).
Discussions revealed that more educated households have a tendency to send their children to better quality schools further away (including as boarders), and even in the national capital. There are few educational institutions with free food and residential facilities established with the support of government and donors in CHT to enhance human capital development (Shelley 1992). The primary 'investment' motivation for schooling children is to allow future generations to acquire credentials so that they can escape the conflict and are less dependent on agriculture. This includes increased prospects of gaining formal and public sector jobs for their children.
We classify production decisions, which involve entrepreneurial risk taking, into the amount of land to be cultivated, and types of crops to be produced. Due to lack of data on relevant variables we apply non-parametric (chi-square) tests instead of regression analysis to gauge the impact of perceived violence on involvement in cultivation and type of cultivation across households (Table 3 ). The majority of indigenous households (61%) engage in cropping own land, while the remainder derive their livelihoods from various occupations other than cropping own land. Estimates show that households perceiving medium and high violence accept more livelihood opportunities outside cropping own land, while only one-third of the total households with low perceptions of violence eschew crop cultivation. About a half of those experiencing medium or high levels of violence persist with cropping their own land. Further investigation into the choice of cultivation techniques among the households with cropping own land revealed that the proportion of jum cultivation relative to the use of the plough decreases with perceptions of violence. The former is the more traditional technique, employed by the indigenous peoples of CHT. The variation in use of production techniques in relation with different levels of perceived violence is found statistically significant (Table 4) . Jum as a type of cultivation technique is used by 28% to 31% of households perceiving medium and high violence, while the figure is 52% for households perceiving low level of violence. On the other hand, plough cultivation is applied by about 73% to 75% households perceiving medium and high level of violence, whereas 67% households with low levels of threats employ plough cultivation as their production technique. The point being that the trauma of violence draws indigenous households away from traditional slash and burn (jum) cultivation to the use of the plough. This can also mean that they are forced to relocate in plain lands, and are compelled to economise on both labour and land as jum cultivation is more intensive in both factors of production. Regression results for the influence of perceived violence on proportion of cultivated land to total land (land use) indicate that households (cropping own land) perceiving medium levels of violence cultivated 30% more land as a proportion of the total land they possess compared to households perceiving low levels of violence, and the result is statistically significant (Table 5) . Apart from perceived violence, growing both food and cash crops statistically significantly raises land use by 43%.
In the CHT the majority of indigenous households who crop their own land (60%) produce mixed crops, with 38% engaged in only food crops. It has to be borne in mind that cash crop cultivation involves more risk of physical and economic loss, and we would expect more subsistence food cultivation following conflict, and the trauma of violence. The proportion of household producing only cash crops is negligible.
Regression techniques using logit and probit regression were run where the endogenous variable mixed crop is in the form of a dummy variable (0 and 1), and the results are reported in table 6. When we relate these figures to the subjective experience of violence the proportion of households producing mixed crops is 63%, 61% and 58% for those households perceiving high, medium and low levels of violence respectively. It appears that the propensity for mixed cultivation rises slightly with subjective perceptions of violence. The estimated coefficient (at 1% level) for medium level of perceived violence suggests that this type of households are more likely to produce mixed crops by about 8% in comparison with the households perceiving low level of violence. Similarly, households perceiving high levels of violence are producing more mixed crop by 8%, compared to the households perceiving low levels of violence, this result is statistically significant at a 5% level. The variables, different levels of perceived violence (both medium and high)
are found positively related with the mixed crop production with statistical significance across the logit and probit regression models. Our findings are qualitatively similar to that of Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) for post-conflict rural Burundi, where the cultivation of cash crops also increased. In addition to the variable of interest (perceived level of violence) it also found that there are some other explanatory variables; age of household head, sex of household head, household head passed secondary education, amount of land cultivated, and plough cultivation which also have significant association with the dependent variable, mixed cropping. We find that greater education and age in the head of household enhances the probability of mixed crop cultivation as a riskier activity than food crop alone.
Our apparently anomalous results, with respect to rising risk taking in cropping patterns following greater subjective feelings of violent experiences, can only be explained by less well known theories about risky behaviour. Conventional wisdom would suggest that individuals become more risk averse after an adverse shock, such as conflict and the fear of violence. This is also the prediction of expected utility theory in conjunction with the concavity property of standard utility functions leading to the properties of diminishing marginal utility of income, as well as absolute risk aversion. The standard precepts of expected utility do not, however, hold in many contexts. In our case, we can argue that both land dispossession and subjective perceptions of violence amount to 'trauma', which has a pecuniary counterpart that may be characterised as one where the concerned individual or household has sustained a financial loss. Markowitz (1952) Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we may utilize prospect theory to explain our empirical findings with regard to cropping patterns, bearing in mind that cash crop cultivation is more risky, as it does not guarantee the household's subsistence and is more subject to market fluctuations. Prospect theory represents a departure from expected utility in that it is a two stage process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by (subjective) probability of the different risky states, but by a more complicated 'decision weighting' process. The first stage of the decision involves, an editing phase where a reference point is chosen to evaluate the likely effect of the actual risky investment framed in terms of specific aspects of the highly valued by the decision maker. As has been indicated, following the trauma of eviction and/or violence, individuals may feel that the key value of assets have diminished and must be replaced as a priority. In the second stage of evaluation, when the household decides on its type of crop investments, it may take more risks, if the risky project has a high enough decision weight compared to the less risky alternative. Decision weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain project bearing fruition, but it also includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, a
property that alters less readily in the mind than the pure probability of success. The point being that taking on more risks is understandable if there is a substantial chance that more risky investments will lead to recuperation of particular erstwhile losses. This may explain why households with a greater perception of violence are more likely to invest in the more risky cash crops, as well as increase land use in agriculture.
5 Conclusions
This research suggests that heightened subjective perceptions of violence may lower consumption expenditure as a risk reducing tactic, while raising land use intensity and risky mixed crop cultivation. In some cases relatively high perceptions of violence raises the likelihood of households schooling their children. But this effect only becomes significant when combined with specific forms of conflict experiences. This indicates that a post-conflict 'phoenix' factor may be in operation at the household level in which some income raising livelihood decisions are made as a consequence of fear of renewed violence. In the short-run, the factor appears to operate through both increased land use and cash crop cultivation and in the long run through increased human capital. Arguably, these decisions can be seen as raising the risk threshold as the quality of land may deteriorate, cash crops may be more vulnerable to pests and disease and price falls, and the chances of getting a significant return from schooling are not only far in the future, but also low in terms of access to formal economy occupations for these indigenous people.
11 Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , let the value (V) of the household's risky prospect be:
. 
Here v(x) is the value of the risky project; v(y) is the value of the less risky project; p refers to the probability of success of x, π is the decision weight which is a positive function of both the probability of success, and losses (L) previously sustained. It is immediately apparent that an increase in losses due to perceptions of violence will raise the attractiveness of the risky project by weighing the decision weight more heavily in favour of x. It may be possible that there is a reaction to higher fear of violence after an imperfect accord ending a low-intensity conflict aimed at autonomy and not secession. This reaction may make some people bolder and more risk taking in order to enhance their long-term future in the context of likely macro-political continuity, albeit with significant fear of future violence at the household micro-level. Prospect theory may also be useful in understanding this reaction, as people frame their decisions in the light of socioeconomic priorities that precede any valuation of the consequences of greater risk-taking.
But exploration of these behavioural economics explanations must await further research.
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